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1 Parts of this work appeared earlier as Crowston, K. (1996). “Market-enabling Internet agents”. In J. I. DeGross, S. Jarvenpaa
and A. Srinivasan (Eds.), Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Systems, Columbus, OH and Crow-
ston, K. (1997). “Price behaviour in an electronic market”. (Research in progress paper, International Conference on Informa-
tion Systems, Atlanta, GA). This paper has benefited from discussions with Martha Garcia-Murillo, Sunil Gupta, Robert
Heckman, Junseok Hwang, Jian Qin, Dmitri Roussinov, Steve Sawyer, George Widmeyer, Rolf Wigand and Ping Zhang and
from the assistance of Jackie Chang, Rajah Shah and Phillip Strnad. This work was partially supported by a grant from the i-
Lab, London Business School.
2 Note that we do not consider as markets a single merchant who stocks multiple products or a “mall” hosting multiple mer-
chants but lacking features for making price or other comparisons across merchants. This definition excludes many self-
described markets, such as Industry Net.
Abstract
The Internet offers a vision of ubiquitous elec-
tronic commerce. A particularly useful feature is the
ability to automate the search for price or other in-
formation across multiple vendors by using an
“agent” to retrieve relevant information. The use of
agents has the potential to dramatically reduce buy-
ers’ search costs. We develop a framework that sug-
gests that vendors who sell products with many dif-
ferentiating factors beyond price will tend to accept
agents, while vendors of commodities or branded
goods will tend to resist them unless they have lower
costs than their competitors. Empirically, we found
that agents seem to be accepted for differentiated
goods, but resisted for more commoditized goods,
though not universally. An analysis of prices from
one agent shows that 1) a small number of vendors
tended to have the lowest prices and 2) while diver-
gence in pricing remains, price dispersion declined
over the period studied.
Introduction
Networks bridge geography, distance and cul-
ture, creating new opportunities for interaction and
competition. Debate is increasing on how the on-
going digital and communications revolution will
change the nature of commerce. The growth of com-
merce on the Internet has attracted special interest.
Being a public network and increasingly ubiquitous,
the Internet neatly addresses the problem of connec-
tivity between potential trading partners (Neches,
Neches, Postel, Tenenbaum, & Frank, n.d.), extend-
ing even to consumers. The existence of multiple
vendors for some goods leads to the possibility of a
market for those items, in the specific sense of multi-
ple vendors whose prices and offerings are compared
for each sale.2
Clearly there are many potential obstacles to In-
ternet commerce—the need for security, authentica-
tion and payment schemes are frequently mentioned,
as are the lack of negotiation protocols or even com-
monly accepted business practices—but these are
rapidly being addressed. Internet sales are expected
to continue to increase, following the lead of cata-
logue and television sales. There are already numer-
ous Internet vendors selling a variety of products,
including music CDs, computer hardware and soft-
ware and a host of others.
Effects of market making Internet agents
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The basic argument of this paper is that one ap-
proach to developing an Internet marketplace is
through the use of an “agent.” An agent is a program,
simple or intelligent, that operates autonomously to
retrieve and process information on a user’s behalf
(Maes, 1994). In this paper, we focus on the use of
agents to support a potential purchase decision. The
idea is that a computer program can retrieve (or even
negotiate, e.g., Chavez, Dreilinger, Guttman, &
Maes, 1997) price, availability, and other product
information for a desired good and compare them to
identify the vendor with the lowest-cost or best set of
features, thus automating part of the purchase process
and increasing market efficiency. For example, An-
dersen Consulting’s Bargain Finder agent (Krulwich,
1996), now defunct, took the name and artist of a
music CD and retrieved its price from several Inter-
net CD stores with on-line searchable catalogues.
This agent quickly identified which vendors carry the
CD and facilitated easy price comparisons, key char-
acteristics of an efficient market.
The remainder of the paper is presented in two
parts. First, we discuss the function of market-search
agents. The distinctive contribution of this paper is a
framework for the role of such agents in electronic
commerce. This framework is summarized in a pay-
off matrix showing the outcomes from decisions by
vendors to cooperate or resist the use of agents.
Analysis of the incentives for participation in an
electronic market is a necessary precondition for their
development. In this, our goals are similar to those of
Reimers (1996), who analyzed the institutional and
incentive structure pre-conditions for electronic mar-
kets. We use our framework to predict the kind of
goods for which agents are likely to be successful.
In the second half of the paper, we compare the
predictions of our framework with illustrative exam-
ples of buyer’s agents for a range of products. We
note a prominent counter-example to our predictions,
shopper.com. To further explore the framework, we
report on an analysis of price data gathered from
shopper.com. We use this data to explore the fit be-
tween the framework’s predictions and empirical
observation. In particular, we test a crucial assump-
tion of the framework, that the vendor that has the
lowest prices for one product will be cheapest for
many (“winner-take-all”). We also examine changes
in prices over time to test a common prediction of the
electronic commerce literature, that better informa-
tion leads to convergence of prices (e.g., Bakos,
1991).
Literature Review
Agents are software programs that operate
autonomously to retrieve and process information on
a user’s behalf (Maes, 1994). Many simple agents are
already available to assist in navigation and informa-
tion retrieval (e.g., O'Leary, 1996). Deployed on the
Internet, agents make searching for information eas-
ier. Guttman et al. (1998) note that agents can support
different stages of a buyer’s purchasing process: need
identification, product and merchant brokering, ne-
gotiation, purchase and delivery, and service and
evaluation. Similarly, Jonkheer (1999) provides a
model of a transaction to show where agents can
make provide assistance. Agents assist buyers be-
cause they can retrieve relevant information directly
from on-line vendors and present it to a potential
buyer in summary form (e.g., Chavez et al., 1997;
Doorenbos, Etzioni, & Weld, 1997; Etzioni & Weld,
1995; Yovovich, 1995).
In this paper, we focus in particular on the use of
agents to choose a vendor for a particular good, what
Guttman et al. (1998) call merchant brokering.
Greenwald and Kephart (1999) call such an agent a
“shopbot”. When such an agent operates across the
range of vendors offering a product (what Yovovich
(1995) referred to as a buy-side agent, rather than a
sell-side agent), it essentially creates an electronic
market comprising the offerings of these vendors.
Viewing agents as market enablers has the advantage
of bringing to bear the extensive literature on mar-
kets, electronic and otherwise.
Of course, electronic markets are nothing new.
Formal electronic markets have developed for spe-
cific goods, such as airline reservation systems, stock
markets, as well as electronic markets for electric
power (Johnson, 1995), airliner parts (Choudhury,
1997; Malone, Yates, & Benjamin, 1989, p. 167),
truck capacity (Steinfield, Kraut, & Plummer, 1995)
and even seeds (SeedQuest OnLine,
http://www.seedquest.com/). However, agent-enabled
markets differ in at least two significant respects.
• First, the Internet is non-proprietary and public,
so it is possible for an agent to access prices
from a variety of vendors without special techni-
cal arrangements. As a result, an agent can create
an effective electronic market from the diverse
offerings of independent vendors (the “involun-
tary market” propery), at least in the sense of fa-
cilitating the contact between buyer and seller
(Bailey & Bakos, 1997; Malone, Yates, & Ben-
jamin, 1987).
• Second, an agent can search vendors in parallel
rather than sequentially, thus reducing search
costs to zero at the margin (the “zero-marginal-
search-cost” property). Of course, even a simple
database of prices could have this effect, al-
though creating such a database without the co-
operation of the vendors basically requires cre-
ating an agent to gather the prices.
